The following text is coming together as part of my thesis, so it reads like part of a larger whole. Also, formatting this for a blog is very lame.
Gramsci, Weber and Counter-HegemonyFoundations for a Radical Civil Society TheoryToday's mainstream theories of civil society, it has been argued, overlook practices that are not aimed at influencing centers of political and economic authority. These may be specific actions of otherwise 'engaged' movements, the entire action repertoire of movements purposefully avoiding institutional encounters or even social forces for which the term 'movement' is inappropriate.
Of course, this problem is not confined to civil society literature. The theoretical trends between related disciplines are reflective. In this case, social movement theory's intimate connections with theories of civil society has imported many statist assumptions. Mainstream social movement theories (political process theory, resource mobilization theory, NSM etc.) revolve around the same structuralist core as the statist theories of civil society outlined above. The discipline's focus on movement strategy is housed in a political contention paradigm that views movements as "vehicles for making political claims and acting in relation to the state;" consequently, as with theories of civil society, it "fails to examine the ways in which movements reshape beliefs, moral codes, identities, and other cultural elements" (Flacks, 2004:136).
The structuralist paradigm is insufficient for understanding the actions, forms, and goals of numerous current political and social forces. Among them, radical communities have been uniquely impacted by this deficit. The popularity of structuralist theories has hampered social movement theory's ability to engage with communities built upon explicitly anti-statist values. It misses the small, relational associations that form the social foundations of these communities. The radical perspective is rooted in an all together different understanding power and social change. It is their view that Kaldor's 'centers of political and economic authority' are some of the last places to look to foment social change. Therefore, before we can construct social movement theory that is relevant for radical communities, we must develop a theory frameowrk that reflects the radical view of power and social change. This begins not by asking 'what is radical civil society?' but 'where in civil society are radicals?'
Hints from Radical TheoryRather than patching current, mainstream civil society theories until they fit the task at hand, it is necessary to build from the bottom up, reclaiming terms and concepts for use in a new, radical theory of civil society. A critical step in this process is the careful incorporation movement-created theory. If the discipline wants to fully understand the processes of social change initiated by or involving radical communities and movements, it must listen to what they are saying. There is no shortage of literature. This delay may be due to the inherent and constructed barriers within and between radical pedagogy and activist communities. However, all claims of over- and anti-intellectualism aside, the fundamental fact is that there is theory being developed within radical movements and communities.
When we look at this theory we see an interesting trend, one that may help cross the academy-movement divide. The discussions regarding the mechanics of social change, that is, the radical view of the dynamics and factors affecting social change, echoes the work of Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci argues that the complex program of radical social change in a modern liberal democracy involves - more than anything - the development of a strong and dynamic culture capable of establishing the necessary institutions for a subversion of power. The articulation of contemporary radical politics has evolved its early focus on style, moved past a primary focus on direct confrontation with political society, and has blossomed into a body of communities, organizations and institutions that closely mirror Gramsci's culturally thick, passion-infused, counter-hegemonic base (Carlsson, 2008; Day, 2005; Gordon, 2007; O'Hara, 2001; Spannos, 2008).
Despite his potential usefulness, a clear problem with bringing Gramsci into the discussion is the volume of literature surrounding his work. His is hardly an uncontroversial body of ideas. The Civil Society concept experienced a surge in popularity following the dismantling of the Soviet bloc and Gramsci's Civil Society was re-awoken as part of the scramble to explain the quick, unanticipated and dramatic changes taking place. However, its use by Sovietologists, intellectuals and the media did not arise from a thorough analysis and application of Gramsci's work. Joseph Buttigeig, arguably the leading expert on Gramsci's texts in the US, notes that the increasingly frequent allusions to the concept were not, in most cases "accompanied by a clear understanding of its intricate genealogy and of its many different nuances, or, even less, by an awareness of Gramsci's perspicacious treatment of it" (Buttigieg, 1995:2). This is a particularly important accusation as it comes from a linguist who has undertaken a mammoth, multi-volume translation of Gramsci's complete Prison Notebooks.
This trend continues today. Looking at the influential interpretation offered by the London School of Economics Centre for Civil Society's Global Civil Society yearbook, the concept is identified with - or is defined as - an ensemble of popular progressive movements not necessarily linked to any political party. It is equated with 'the people' standing in opposition to 'the state,' meaning government. The worldwide participation of millions in the 2003 Iraq War protests is described as "the mobilisation of global civil society" (Kaldor et al., 2003:3-4 in Buttigieg, 2005). The normative prescriptions and the implied state/non-state opposition paradigm limits the concept's unique flexibility. More importantly, though these interpretations of civil society refer to and rely on Gramsci's ideas, they are built upon a serious misreading of his work. Buttigieg argues,
The editors of the Global Civil Society yearbook misconstrue Gramsci’s core ideas on the State and civil society even while invoking him to bolster their incompatible basic thesis that civil society is 'the non-state and the non-economic area of social interaction.' They are blinded, it seems, by an unwavering determination to draw a line that clearly demarcates the absolute autonomy of civil society.
(Buttigieg, 2005:41-2)
It may seem strange to turn to an author whose legacy seems to have become so messy. However, the focus on Gramsci is not simply an effort to clear his name or tarnish those of other scholars; in fact, this is exactly what a radical relevance focused project must avoid.
I take Gramsci's development of the term as my focus because his original meaning serves radical communities well in the process of elucidating their vision: their theory of power, movement and change.
Gramsci's LibraryTo get at those elements of Gramsci's work that seem relevant based on what radical communities are saying, we must slice through the maze of Gramscian discourse. The application of loaded phrases brings a history of academic arguments that is largely irrelevant to these communities and invites further divisiveness that may only change the intended focus: relevant radical theory. "Rather than simplistically believing Gramsci has the answers or holds the key to different historical and contemporary problems," Adam David Morton argues, stress should be placed on "the importance of thinking in a Gramscian way" (Morton, 2007:35). Scholars should aim to internalize his method so as to approach the issue of contemporary radical communities in a truly Gramsican way. This means shaking off compromised terms, rebuilding and reclaiming them with their subject in mind. In short, we must start over. We do not have to reinvent the wheel, but we cannot begin with the car.
Therefore, I introduce Gramsci's writing with the understanding that his work should be reexamined in order to develop "a point of departure to deal with similar problematics in our own time" (Morton, 2007:36). Of course, there is no space here for a full historical picture of Gramsci and the totality of his work. Instead, I will deal with those portions of Gramsci's thought most relevant to contemporary radical communities and those most commonly rendered in radical-produced theory: Hegemony, Domination, Civil Society and the State. In an effort to pull away from a 'simplistic' relation of Gramsci's ideas and instead develop a Gramscian vision, I situate his work alongside that of Max Weber. Taken together, Weber and Gramsci provide a broader picture of the encounter of socialism and modern sociology, a particularly useful framework given the goal of developing social movement theory attuned to the experience of contemporary radical communities. Of course, a major bridge between the work for Gramsci and Weber is Marx. Consequently, it must be kept in mind that the critique of capitalism and the work of Marx serve as sort of common ground, a backdrop that helps to bind together Gramscian Marxism and Weberian sociology.
Gramsci and Weber: Isolated ContemporariesFirst, it seems important to highlight some biographical details about Gramsci to provide a clearer picture of the extent of Gramsci's knowledge of Weber before his incarceration and during his imprisonment.
Gramsci was born in Sardinia in 1891. He attended the University of Turin on scholarship and joined the Socialist Party there in 1914. While in Turin he made a name for himself as a journalist and leader in Turin's factory council movement. He joined a Socialist congress walkout and in 1921 helped to form the Communist Party of Italy, which he became leader of. Between 1922 and 1926, Gramsci and the party struggled against the rise of Italian fascism under Mussolini. Political repression was rampant and reached a head in 1926 under a new set of emergency laws. Gramsci was arrested, despite supposed parliamentary immunity, and his trial was little more than a show. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison. Gramsci suffered from health complications his entire life and his time in prison aggravated these problems. Due to the severity of his condition, only eight years after his arrest Gramsci transfered to a guarded hospital in Rome where he spent the last two years of his life before his death in 1937 (Buttigieg, 2002:67).
Much of Gramsci's work comes from a series of notebooks he kept while in prison. The notebooks themselves cover a wide array of topics and their translation and interpretation has been the focus of numerous scholars since their first appearance in 1946. In that time, the connections between Gramsci's words and the writings of Max Weber has interested a number of scholars, most notably Carl Levy. He notes that while there is room for comparison of the main themes found in Gramsci's and Weber's political and scientific writings, the assertion that "a good deal of the political reflections found in the Prison Notebooks were characterized by explicit or implicit, specific or generic references to Max Weber...is greatly exaggerated" (Levy, 1987:382).
First, there is the question of the extent of Gramsci's knowledge of Weber's work before and during his imprisonment. Gramsci was fully aquatinted with Weber's Parliament and Government before prison. In work completed in 1922, Gramsci had "translated Weber's example of Junker domination and distortion of the prewar German state into its Italian equivalent" (Levy, 1987:388). Once in prison, though, Gramsci's resources were severely limited and his access to and engagement with Weber's work became more sporadic. In the Notebooks, Gramsci uses three Weberian texts:
Parliament and Government (1919), not available in prison but quoted from memory on several occasions; passages from Economy and Society, transmitted via an article by Robert Michels...and The Protestant Ethic, available via an Italian serialization in 1931-32
(Levy, 1987: 389)
Gramsci also has access to a number of Robert Michels' works while in prison. Michels had been a student of Weber and taught at the University of Turin while Gramsci attended.
Though Weber is only referenced directly in five passages of the Notebooks, Weberian concepts appear throughout the texts without direct reference. Of interest here are: 1) the similarities of Weber and Gramsci's discussions of the state and domination and 2) the intersections of Weber's analysis of the Protestant sects in America and Gramsci's view of culture in the development of hegemony and counter-hegemony.
Gramsci and Weber: Domination and the StateWeber's definition of the state is presented quite clearly in Politics as a Vocation. He views the state as a type of political association. It is the modern form in historical progression and "[l]ike the political institutions historically preceding it, the state is a relation of men dominating men..." (Weber, 1946: 78). Thus, individual forms of political association are defined less by their 'ends' - domination - than by the 'means' they employ.
When Weber discusses 'means' he is referring to the form of power exercised in order to overcome the resistance of another. Power can manifest itself in a number of forms. Appealing to the self-interest of resisters, convincing resistance to willingly submit and the use of sheer physical force (i.e violence) are all examples. Domination, though, is never a settled position. Political associations must continually interface with the dominated through these power relations to maintain the authority they claim.
The state, Weber argues, like other political associations, employs all of these power dynamics to varying degrees. However, the state's use of violence is unique. The state alone "claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within given territory" (Weber, 1946:78).
But what, Weber asks, does state domination rest upon? "When and why do men obey? Upon what inner justifications and upon what external means does this domination rest" (Weber, 1946:78). He describes three basic forms of 'inner justifications' or legitimations of domination: Charismatic, Traditional and Legal.
Charismatic legitimation rests on the personal charisma of a leader. "Men do not obey him by virture of tradition or statute, but because they believe in him" (Weber, 1946:79). This form of legitimacy does not mesh with a heavy use of force as it is tied to a continued reverence for the particular charasmatic leader. Legitimacy built on tradition appeals to the notion of the 'eternal yesterday,' as Weber puts it. The accumulated precedent of a particular form of political association lends credence to its legitimacy simply by virtue of its age and routine.
Legal legitimacy rests on the accepted validity of a particular set of rules. The modern state relies primarily on legal rationality for its legitimacy (though it can and has mixed other forms). In this sense, for example, the state develops a set of rules for the appropriate and accepted use of violence, as in the social contract surrounding the conduct of the police. Thus, the state becomes the "sole source of the right to use violence" (Weber, 1946:78).
It is possible to find similar themes in Gramsci's work. In his sixth notebook, Gramsci makes clear his theory of the state:
For it should be noted that certain elements that fall under the general notion of the state must be restored to the notion of civil society (in the sense, one might say, that state = political society + civil society, that is, hegemony protected by the armor of coercion)
(Gramsci, 2007:75)
Immediately we can see that Gramsci, like Weber, understands the state as more than the common (and more narrow) definition of the state as government. From a Weberian and Gramscian perspective, the state is a complex of social relations, a particular social order that represents the domination of a particular social group over others.
Gramsci's development of the means by which dominance is maintained echoes Weber's three-fold power array (appealing to self interest, violence and willing submission), but develops it further into a more structured model. Gramsci theorized that dominant groups maintain their position through a mix of sheer force (coercion through political society) and, more importantly, with the active participation of the subordinate groups (consent through hegemony in civil society).
The use of coercion in the process of domination is the domain of what he calls 'political society,' meaning "the armed forces, police, law courts and prisons, together with all the administrative departments concerning taxation finance, trade, industry, social security, etc." (Simon, 1990:71). In Gramsci's view, however, these are only a portion of the state's domination framework. Indeed, the role of political society, the "apparatus of state coercive power," is to enforce "discipline on those groups who do not 'consent'" (Gramsci, 2003:12). The state, or dominant group, only turns to coercive tactics if efforts to manufacture consent fail.
Consent to domination, the second portion of Gramsci's formula of power, is developed within civil society. It is an internalized form of domination that differs from the external, "direct domination" achieved through the coercive force of political society (Gramsci, 2003:12). Civil society is the sphere within which the state pursues (and maintains) hegemony, a social order where "a common social-moral language is spoken, in which one concept of reality is dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of thought and behaviour" (Femia, 1981:24). Hegemony, however, is not simply achieved through the alignment of the free choices of subordinate groups. Consent is actively manufactured within civil society; hegemony is pursued through "extremely complex mediums, diverse institutions, and constantly changing processes" (Buttigieg, 1995:7). "Through their presence and participation in various institutions, cultural activities, and many other forms of social interaction, the dominant classes 'lead' the society in certain directions" (Buttigieg, 2005:44). Hegemony operates through the social institutions of civil society: the church, the educational system, the press, all the bodies which help create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order. Gramsci's civil society "is best described not as the sphere of freedom but of hegemony" (Buttigieg, 1995:6).
If we are to internalize a Gramscian perspective as a 'point of departure' for analyzing contemporary problems, we must allow his models to remain flexible. Fortunately, one of the key strengths of Gramsci’s 'state = political society + civil society' formula is its versatility. In contrast to defining boundaries or components based on specific, tangible characteristics, he conceives of civil society as a theoretical space, a plane where the myriad processes of hegemony creation, retention and opposition take place. Consequently, the institutions of civil society through which hegemony is built can and will vary between different societies and different times. Further, Gramsci understood that the delineation between consent and coercion, and between political and civil society, is a porous one. For example, recalling Weber's notion of the 'right to violence,' the police and courts - organs of coercion - operate with a high level of consent in many societies today. Indeed, in modern democracies, the overt use of force by the government to coerce opponents has given way to more subtle forms of coercion. Buttigieg alludes to this in his discussion on the US-led War on Terror:
In the United States, both in the aftermath of 9/11 and in the buildup to the Iraq War, the Bush administration did not arrest anyone who opposed its interpretation of events, nor did it shut down any newspaper, television network, or radio station that questioned its views and policies. Instead, it invoked patriotism, national security, and the obligation to support ‘‘our troops,’’ and, then, left it to the most influential institutions of civil society to bring the overwhelming majority of the citizenry into line and to marginalize the dissenters through a campaign of vilification.
(Buttigieg, 2005:46)
This is an excellent example of a modern application of a Gramscian perspective on power and dominance, allowing his concepts to remain somewhat “loose and elastic,” attaining precision when "brought into contact with a particular situation which it helps to explain – a contact which develops the meaning of the concepts” (Cox, 1983:162-3).
Gramsci's notion of hegemony within civil society as means of dominance by way of "presence and participation in various institutions, cultural activities, and many other forms of social interaction" is particularly interesting when we compare it with Weber's discussions of religion and its effects within society and his views on culture (Buttigieg, 2005:44). Weber's Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism explores the role of 'church-mindedness' in American society around the turn of the century. It is possible to apply a Gramscian formula to his analysis, further fusing the work of these two theorists into the sort of internalized, Gramscian perspective suggested above.
Gramsci and Weber: Culture, Counter-Hegemony and the Protestant Sects in America There seem to be significant points of convergence between Gramsci's views on culture as a means to hegemony and Weber's views on religion and its effects within society, particularly in America. Further, Weber's subtle critique of over-determinant materialism in Marx can be seen, though not as explicitly, in Gramsci's broadened understanding of processes of hegemony formation.
In Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber discusses the role of religious affiliations and organizations in early 20th century America, a society whose formerly pervasive 'church-mindedness' was succumbing to increased secularization. In an earlier America, observes Weber, church-mindedness went unquestioned. It formed an integral social function within society and "the question of religious affiliation was almost always posed in social life and in business life" (Weber, 1946:303). In contrast to church membership, sect affiliation is voluntary and thus open to discrimination based on the individual's perceived moral character. Thus, acceptance serves as a sort of guarantee of one's personal moral qualifications.
Sect membership carried with it access to a host of social, business and, by extension, political opportunities. Once recognized by others as an upstanding and reputable individual (confirmed by membership), new avenues for credit, business opportunities and support in times of trouble are opened. Conversely, Weber notes, "expulsion from one's sect for moral offenses has meant, economically, loss of credit and, socially, being declassed" (Weber, 1946:306).
Sect membership brought with it a particular set of behavioral requirements in the conduct of business and social life, a key to understanding the social power of these associations. Of course, coming from a religious body, these mandates are tied to notions of 'goodness.' However, Weber notes that while the idea that the gods give riches to those who please them is pervasive among the religions of the world, Protestant sects in America brought this notion into practice and connected it with economic life. Protestant sects tied their religious justifications for material success to a range of economic and social practices and values deemed 'good.' This included, in Weber's Methodist example, prohibition of usury, haggling, irresponsible borrowing, etc. Weber argues that while the range of practices may have varied among the sects, the overall ethic was the same. A premium was placed upon the individualism of 'proving' oneself before man and god, helping to "deliver the 'spirit' of modern capitalism, its specific ethos: the ethos of the modern bourgeois middle classes" (Weber, 1946: 321)
Consequently, these associations served as "vehicles of social ascent into the circle of the entrepreneurial middle class. They served to diffuse and to maintain the bourgeois capitalist ethos among the broad strata of the middle class" (Weber 1946:308). Here we see the Protestant sects as conduits for instilling capitalist values amongst a wide base of American society, born on the back of theology. Weber notes that without diffusion and maintenance of these principles through religious communities, "...capitalism today, even in America, would not be what it is" (Weber, 1946:309).
As mentioned above, Weber noted a marked decrease in American church-mindedness over the two decades spanning the turn of the century. Secular clubs and societies had moved to fill the vacuum left by the declining importance of religious sect or fraternity affiliation. Formerly, membership in a distinguished sect or fraternity affirmed qualities of the individual, "the self-made man [over] the heir" (Weber, 1946:310). In contrast, the increasingly secularized American society valued affiliation with a distinguished club, a proven Pilgrim pedigree, the type of home one owns or particular modes of dress and sport. The new secularized associational landscape was increasingly built upon the "prestige of birth and inherited wealth, of the office and educational diploma" (Weber, 1946:310). The process of secularization introduced an element of stratification and signaled a 'rising plutocracy' that, in Weber's eyes, stemmed from an increased Europeanization of American society (Weber, 1946:310).
Marx provides an interesting link between Weber's illustration above and Gramsci's analysis of the role of culture in building and maintaing hegemony. In Marx we see a similar concern for the material consequences of religion within society, particularly in terms of stratification and caste systems. In On the Jewish Question, Marx asked what it means for a Jew to seek and achieve 'political emancipation' in Germany, a state with explicitly Christian foundations (Marx, 1978). By emancipation, he means freedom of religion, or, freedom from religion. The political emancipation of a religious man is the emancipation of the state from religion in general; the state gives no preference to any religion and asserts itself only 'the state.' The state is no longer constituted on the basis of any particular religion and, in the eyes of the state, everyone one is 'citizen' (Marx, 1978:29).
In Marx's view, though, the secularization of the state does not necessarily erase its influence on social life. Marx suggests moving the debate to the United States where the state's secularity is explicit and constitutionally mandated. He notes that while the state is explicitly secular in the US, it remains "pre-eminently the country of religiosity" (Marx, 1978: 31). Consequently, individuals become split into both citizens (the secular, public person) and religious men (the private person). The result, again, is not an absence of religiosity in society. Anticipating Weber's observations on the influence of religious associations, Marx notes that the division of a man into 'citizen' and 'religious man' only displaces religion "from the state to civil society" (Marx, 1978:35).
Though Marx and Weber seem to share a view on the social function of religion within civil society, Weber is keen to set his analysis against what he saw as Marxism's one-sided materialist conception of history (Löwith, 1993: 121). However, Weber makes clear that his critique should not be understood as an attempt to "substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of history" (Weber, 1988: 183; Löwith, 1993:121). It is Weber's view that the elements which merge to create society are too complex for any simple formula and "purely economic factors [are] indispensable, but not by themselves sufficient for understanding the nature of capitalism" (Sen, 1985: 5). Thus, Sen continues,
Weber made it clear that the overthrow of capitalism would require a change in the very ethos of human social action which made sense to individuals in terms of their belief in an 'oughtness.' He stressed the correspondence between a set of moral principles and a particular social and historical context.
(Sen, 1985: 10)
Gramsci appears to fuse these positions in the development of his own formulation of the role of cultural factors in the building of a socialist counter-hegemony under conditions of late capitalism. He moves past Weber's somewhat simplistic reading of Marx, incorporating economic materialism while retaining an emphasis on culture.
Culture is used here to mean a system of values and norms that underpin elements of civil society, and in the case of the hegemonic culture, political society as well. Culture is the wellspring from which the rationale and validation for innumerable institutions and practices flows. Like ripples in water, the existence, structure and behavior of the myriad facets of political and civil society can be traced back to culture. We might also use the word 'ideology' in the sense that culture provides social phenomena with a set of rules, codes, and conventions imbued with meanings particular to specific social groups. Gramsci understood cultures as groupings of "all the social elements which share the same mode of thinking and acting" (Gramsci, 2003:324). Thus, different cultures may view the same phenomena in disparate ways as their particular ideological systems (Gramsci refers to this as a culture's 'common sense') color their experiences.
Consequently, the term does not indicate any particular group of values and norms. While it is possible to speak of a dominant culture, it is by no means the only culture. Further, Gramsci viewed culture as a 'precipitate;' ways of being and living that are formed by the "interaction of a multitude of historical processes at particular moments of time" (Crehan, 2002:72). Thus, cultures (and their 'common sense') are somewhat transitory, arenas where "dominant, subordinate and oppositional cultural values meet and intermingle...vying with one another to secure the spaces within which they can [frame and organize] popular experience and consciousness" (Bennett, 1986:xix). There is a striking similarity here between Gramsci's view and Weber's discussion of culture and the 'nation' concept in Structures of Power:
If the concept of 'nation' can in any way be defined unambiguously, it certainly cannot be stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the nation. In the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept undoubtedly means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups. Thus the concept belongs in the sphere of values.
(Weber, 1946: 172)
It is important to understand this view of culture as we begin to discuss Gramsci's ideas about social change.
Gramsci conceived of two methods for challenging hegemony: a ‘war of maneuver’ and a ‘war of position,’ best understood as points on a continuum rather than mutually exclusive options. A 'war of maneuver' involves physically overwhelming the coercive apparatus of the state. However, the success of this strategy depends on the nature of the state's hegemony, that is, its position within civil society. In a comparison of the state in Czarist Russia with that in liberal democracies (referred to as the East and the West respectively), Gramsci notes that the strength of the latter lies in a sturdy civil society [here Gramsci uses the term State to mean government, or political society, as opposed to his more broad definition used elsewhere and throughout this text (i.e. State= political society + civil society)]:
In the East the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between State and civil society, and when the state tottered, a sturdy structure of civil society was immediately revealed. The State was just a forward trench; behind it stood a succession of sturdy fortresses and emplacements.
(Gramsci, 2007:169)
In modern liberal democracies, direct confrontation (armed uprising, general strike, etc.) will not threaten the dominant groups so long as their credibility and authority is firmly rooted in civil society. Buttigieg notes, "civil society, in other words, far from being a threat to political society in a liberal democracy, reinforces it—this is the fundamental meaning of hegemony" (Buttigieg, 2005:41).
However, Gramsci does not give up on the notion of radical change in liberal democracies, he was a writer principally focused on a radical transformation of capitalist society. His central concern was "how might a more equitable and just order be brought about, and what is it about how people live and imagine their lives in particular times and places that advances or hampers progress to this more equitable and just order" (Crehan, 2002:71). Consequently, it was his view that "one should refrain from facile rhetoric about direct attacks against the State and concentrate instead on the difficult and immensely complicated tasks that a 'war of position' within civil society entails" (Buttigieg, 2005:41)
Described by Gramsci as "the only viable possibility in the West," a 'war of position' is resistance to domination with culture, rather than physical might, as its foundation (Gramsci, 2007:168). Cox succinctly describes a 'war of position' as process which "slowly builds up the strength of the social foundations of a new state" by "creating alternative institutions and alternative intellectual resources within existing society" (Cox, 1983:165). For Gramsci, issues of culture are what lie at the heart of any revolutionary project; culture is "how class is lived," it shapes how people see their world and how they maneuver within in it and, more importantly, "it shapes their ability to imagine how it might be changed, and wether they see such changes as feasible or desirable" (Crehan, 2002:71).
The complex program of radical social change in a modern liberal democracy, as described by Gramsci, involves more than anything, developing a strong and dynamic culture capable of establishing the necessary institutions for a subversion of hegemony. Gramsci notes that it must be born of a popular, mass culture in order to create the shared vision necessary for challenging hegemony:
An historical act can only be performed by 'collective man', and this presupposes the attainment of a 'cultural-social' unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world, both general and particular, operating in transitory bursts (in emotional ways) or permanently (where the intellectual base is so well rooted, assimilated and experienced that it becomes passion).
(Gramsci, 2003:349)
An Internalized Gramscian PerspectiveWeber's theories of power and it's appearance in his analysis of the Protestant sects in America support and, perhaps, influenced Gramsci's thinking. Gramsci accepts the Weberian view of the role of violence in domination, incorporating it into one side of his 'state = political society + civil society' formula (i.e. coercion through political society). Gramsci also appears to adopt a Weberian view of culture as a means of social consolidation, encouraging a sense of solidarity among "all those who think of themselves as being the specific 'partners' of a specific 'culture' diffused among the members of the polity" (Weber, 1946: 172).
However, Gramsci improves upon Weber, synthesizing these perspectives into a somewhat more methodical formula. Further, Gramsci's analysis benefits from his observations of the political tumult and rise of fascism in Italy. Gramsci offers a more forward looking framework, arguing that in modern liberal democracies, power is maintained primarily through hegemony in civil society, that is, through culture. While coercive tactics can be useful, domination is insured by hegemony within civil society. The hegemonic culture 1) encourages behavior that supports the goals of the dominant group, 2) contains mechanisms that encourage the dominated to willingly adopt and internalize the hegemonic system of values and norms and 3) discourages behavior that does not advance the goals goals of the dominant class or challenges their supremacy.
The aim here has been to distill a Gramscian perspective from Gramsci's work so as to move past a single-minded adherence on his words and bring his ideas into contemporary contexts. By connecting Gramsci's work with Weber's writings on domination and culture, the specifics of their individual texts, to some extent, fall away, leaving a generalized Gramscian perspective on domination and resistance.
A counter-hegemonic project of social change informed by Gramsci is two-fold: 1) identifying the direct relationship between particular social problems and the hegemonic value system and 2) identifying the mechanisms by which the hegemonic value system masks its relation to those problems, insinuates itself into the minds of the subordinate, and creates behavior that reenforces its primacy. This careful analysis is vital in order to accurately design an appropriate cultural response. This response is a deliberate and shrewd articulation of an alternative system of values and norms, subsequently expressed through alternative social institutions and intellectual resources, aimed at dismantling hegemony by subverting it. This is counter-hegemony.
This distilled Gramscian perspective is particularly helpful as we begin to look at radical communities' program of social change. The articulation of contemporary radical politics has evolved it's early focus on style, moved past a primary focus on direct confrontation with political society, and has blossomed into body of communities, organizations and institutions that closely mirror Gramsci's culturally thick, passion-infused counter-hegemonic base.
An important example of this counter-hegemonic maturation process is the birth and development of the modern DiY/Punk community. As mainstream culture lost interest in punk in the early 1980s, a new punk began to emerge. Partly an answer to the excess and wasted recklessness that preceded it, DiY (Do-it-Yourself) initially surfaced when bands began creating their own record labels and recording spaces as major record labels became disinterested in the genre. However, DiY quickly became fused to the core of the modern punk movement and over the last 25 years, the DiY/Punk movement has blossomed into a massive and "widely varied political subculture," one which shares many members with the movements of the new transnational activism. Ultimately, the DiY ethic is about "creating your own alternative" and "being aware of your own possibilities" (Poldervaart, 2001: 151).
Accordingly, the 'common sense' of DiY/Punk culture has served as the foundation for the development of a diverse body of social and intellectual resources that, in many cases, explicitly aim to replace their hegemonic counterparts in the lives of community members. Though it began with the institutions of the music industry (creation, recording, distribution, promotion) and continued into other 'entertainment' media (film, print, theatre, etc.), this cultural construction project has branched into bookstores, restaurants, cafes, youth centers, alternative media outlets, community centers, gardening cooperatives, community-focused political action groups (Food not bombs, Books through Bars), radio stations, retail stores and countless others institutions. Further, and perhaps more importantly, this process has seen the refinement of intellectual resources as well; the culture is getting better at expressing its 'common sense,' not only to 'outsiders' but back on itself as well. The participatory ethic of the culture is repeatedly given voice and reenforced every time someone decides to 'do-it-themselves;' it is how this community "actualiz[es] the ideal that anyone can (and should) be a producer of culture" (Spencer, 2005: 200).
Not only is the DiY/Punk story itself an illustration of the intellectual, cultural and institutional development that radical politics has undergone over the past three decades, but the DiY/Punk community is home to many of the activists, organizations and ideas that are frequently lost in the analytic aggregation under the 'antiglobalization' label. Further, the DiY/Punk community is extremely globalized, represented on every continent in a concrete way that few contemporary movements or communities can claim to be. DiY/Punk is developing the intellectual and institutional foundations unknown to radical politics since their modern heyday at the turn of the century; this thanks to a strong and change-focused culture that has linked its ideology, its 'common sense,' with experience, action and passion.
This paper will now turn to a detailed look at DiY/Punk from the Gramscian perspective for a more nuanced understanding how radical communities understand the nature of power today. Armed with this new lens, we can turn to the task of developing a social movement theory relevant to these communities. Given the importance of 'alternative social institutions' discussed above, our social movement theory should focus on these institutions as the nucleus of today's radical movements. We should examine what these institutions means to community members, how they serve the community, and how (or if) they portend radical social change on a broad scale.
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